REVIEWABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION:
THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR A
PRAGMATIC STANDARD
INTRODUCTION

It is often stated that there is a presumption of a right to judicial
review of administrative action.' Yet, no simple test has been devised
to facilitate the determination of whether a pdrticular administrative
action is subject to judicial review. Rather, courts typically first examine whether the statute governing review of the actions of the particular agency restricts or expands the normal availability of judicial
review.2 Where this threshold inquiry is not determinative, courts
generally consider the ill-defined and overlapping factors of ripeness,
1. The judiciary, Congress, and commentators have all recognized a modem-day
presumption of reviewability. The most notable legislative statement on this subject
is section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701-06 (1970),
which states, inter alia: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof," id. § 702. Section 10 is applicable
to all administrative bodies except to the extent that statutes preclude judicial review
of an agency's action or that final authority over certain actions is exclusively committed to agency discretion by law. Id. § 701.
In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), the Supreme Court
interpreted section 10(a) as reinforcing earlier case law supporting "the basic presumption of judicial review to one 'suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,'
5 U.S.C. § 702, so long as no statute precludes such relief or the action is not one
committed by law to agency discretion, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)." Id.; accord, Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) ("[Jludicial review of such administrative action
is the rule, and nonreviewability an exception which must be demonstrated."); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-57
(1970); National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689,
694-95 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But cf. Utah Int'l, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 126, 128 (10th
Cir. 1973).
Professor Jaffe, in discussing the importance of this presumption, has stated, "[mn
cases of statutory ambiguity or silence, and in new situations in which there are factors
pro and con, . . . the presumption of reviewability plays a decisive role." L. JAFFE
336. Professor Davis has also recognized the existence of this presumption. See
Davis, "Judicial Control of Administrative Action" A Review, 66 CoLum. L. REV.
635, 650 (1966). However, Professor Davis has also warned that the strong endorsement of a presumption of reviewability embodied in the language of Abbott Laboratories and its progeny should not be read literally and that lower courts have not always
followed Supreme Court proclamations. K. DAVIs § 28.08, at 946-47 (Supp. 1970).
See generally W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMmnsTRATLvE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS
112-13 (1970).
2. See notes 4-41 infra and accompanying text.
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formality, and finality and apply them to the agency action in question
to ascertain the propriety of judicial review.' This process of examination is designed to ensure effective judicial scrutiny of agency actions
which have an immediate and adverse effect upon a party while avoiding undue judicial interference with the administrative decision-making process. This Note will examine the role each of these factors
has played in 1973 in judicial determinations of the reviewability of
administrative actions, will illustrate the current trend toward relaxation of these standards, and will conclude with the suggestion that these
factors of ripeness, formality, and finality have become so commingled
that many courts have, in effect, adopted a single reviewability standard which focuses primarily on the impact of the agency action upon
the complaining party, with considerations of comity between the judiciary and the administrative agency relegated to the status of a secondary consideration.
STATUTORY MODIFICATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

In determining the reviewability of allegedly erroneous administrative action, the court must initially examine provisions of the particular agency's enabling statute.4 The enabling statute may affect reviewability either by precluding or restricting review of otherwise reviewable actions or by expanding review to actions which would normally be unreviewable because of a lack of ripeness, formality, or finality.
Statutory Preclusionor Restriction of JudicialReview
Judicial review may be precluded by statutes which either commit
the determination of particular issues exclusively to the discretion of
the agency or explicitly prohibit review of certain administrative actions.5 Such provisions are often grounded upon a belief that an ad3. See, e.g., National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d

689 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659
(D.C. Cir. 1970), dismissed as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); 1970 Developments 281.
4. See 4 K. DAvis § 28.01.
5. The Supreme Court has frequently upheld the constitutional validity of statutes
which preclude judicial review.

See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-67

(1970); Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-58 (1970);
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). In 1973, the constitutionality of a statute which barred review of the Veterans Administration's decisions as
to pension benefits was upheld in Holley v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 175 (E.D.
Ohio 1972), aff'd mem., 477 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1973).

In 1973 statutory insulation of a particular administrative action from judicial
scrutiny was illustrated in Barnhart v. Brinegar, 362 F. Supp. 464 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
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ministrative body which has acquired valuable technical expertise is
more qualified than the judiciary to determine the question with respect to which review is sought.6 Moreover, insulating certain questions of relatively minor public concern from judicial inquiry in this
fashion may greatly alleviate court congestion at a very slight cost to
the litigants since, even in the absence of judicial review, their dispute
will still be heard and passed upon by a knowledgeable, albeit adminis7
trative, tribunal.

Nevertheless, in accordance with the modem day presumption of
reviewability, 8 courts often utilize a very narrow interpretation of statutory terms to conclude that a statute does not preclude review.' The
rationale for this means of avoiding statutory preclusion of judicial
review is, as stated by Professor Jaffe, that judicial review "is a basic
right; it is a traditional power and the intention to exclude it must
be made specifically manifest."'
Early cases suggested that review
In Barnhart,the plaintiff alleged that the Secretary of Transportation and the Missouri
State Highway Commission had failed to comply with the condemnation procedures
set out in section 301 of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1970). The court refused to review
the case, finding review of the agency proceeding in this instance barred by subsection
102(a) of the Act, which states: 'The provisions of section 4651 of this title create
no rights or liabilities and shall not affect the validity of any property acquisition by
purchase or condemnation." 42 U.S.C. § 4602(a) (1970). The court reasoned that
since no rights were established "arising under" federal law, there was no basis for
finding federal question jurisdiction. 362 F. Supp. at 472. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
(1970). Although the APA suggests that any person aggrieved by final agency action
is entitled to judicial -review unless precluded by statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970),
the court held that since no rights had been abridged, the plaintiff did not qualify as
an aggrieved party. Id. Thus, in essence, the Barnhart court found that subsection
102(a) implicitly insulates procedural errors in such condemnation proceedings from
judicial review.
6. See, e.g., United States v. California E. Line, Inc., 348 U.S. 351 (1955).
In California Eastern the Supreme Court considered the reviewability of a Tax Court
decision where the Government sought to recoup excess profits received by a shipper
of British war cargo. The Court attributed its finding, that review of excess profits
cases was precluded by statute, to the Tax Court's "special familiarity with all kinds
of business and accounting practices in regard to profits, losses, etc." Id. at 355.
However, the decision was reviewable because the question of the amount of excess
profits was not reached by the Tax Court. See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
7. See W. GELLHORN & C. BysE,supra note 1, at 6.
8. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663, 66668 (2d Cir. 1973); Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97, 101 (5th Cir. 1973); Aquavella
v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 397, 402 (2d Cir. 1971); Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143,
150-51 (D. Minn. 1973).
10. L. JM"FE 346. Cf. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659,
666 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
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might be considered prohibited by the mere fact that a statute holds
some acts reviewable and says nothing about others. 1

It seems rea-

sonable to conclude, however, that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of legislative intent to preclude judicial review, the modem day presumption of review 1 2 has made the above reasoning obsolete. 13
4
The 1973 decision of Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson'
graphically illustrates the current requirement that a statute must evince a

clear and unmistakable legislative intent to insulate final agency action
from judicial review.
In Kingsbrook, plaintiff claimed the formula being used for Medi-

care reimbursements to medical institutions provided inadequate compensation. 5 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) had initially refused the formula suggested by the plaintiff,
but one and a half years later HEW accepted it for prospective application only.1 6 After meetings with various HEW officials failed to
prove fruitful, plaintiff filed its complaint in federal court, seeking retroactive application of the formula. The district court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that section 405(h) of the Medicare Act,
which stated that no findings of fact or decisions of the Secretary shall

be reviewed "except as herein provided,"'
formula determinations.'

7

prohibited review of such

Reading this provision of the statute as be-

ing addressed to the availability of judicial review of a given act of
the Secretary, the district court in effect held that section 405(h) in11. See, e.g., Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 30506 (1943). Professor Jaffe has made his disdain for such reasoning clear, stating:
The mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should not suffice to support an implication of exclusion as to others. The right to review is too important to be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of legislative intent. L. JAFFE' 357.
However, Professor Jaffe does evince a belief that if the legislative history of the
statute clearly supports an inference that the omission of an express provision granting
review is designed to reflect an intent to preclude review, then that legislative history
should be followed. Id.
12. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
13. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d
1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But see PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC 485 F.2d 718
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3610 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1974) (review
precluded by such a statutory omission despite a lack of clear legislative intent that
the omission have that effect). The PBW case is discussed at notes 60-78 infra
and accompanying text.
14. 486 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1973).
15. Id. at 664-65.
16. Id. at 665-66.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970).
18. Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 355 F. Supp. 965, 970-71
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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sulated all determinations of the Secretary of HEW concerning Medi-

care from judicial scrutiny, except certain actions for which the Act
specifically provided for review.'0

The court of appeals, on the other

hand, reversed, reading section 405(h) as governing the method of
review, but not its availability. 20 Thus, where the Act dictates specific
review procedures for certain actions, these were held to be the exclusive means of review for such actions; 21 however, as to those actions
for which the Medicare Act is silent on the subject of review, section
405(h) was held not to bar judicial review. While the language of
section 405(h) would appear sufficiently broad to support the district

court's construction, the court of appeals' interpretation, by requiring
a high degree of specificity to support a finding that Congress has immunized agency action from judicial consideration, is more consistent
with the prevailing presumption of reviewability.
19. Id.
20. 486 F.2d at 666-68. In choosing this statutory construction, the court placed
great emphasis on Aquavella v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1971), as controlling
precedent. Aquavella also dealt with the question of judicial review under section 405
(h). After examining the legislative history of the Medicare Act, the Aquavella court
concluded:
Where the Medicare Act establishes procedures for review of the Secretary's
decision, a court may not review that decision by any other means. However,
where the Act does not provide such procedures, section 405(h) does not preclude review. Id. at 402.
21. The Second Circuit in Kingsbrook thus recognized in dictum that review statutes can set out specific procedures that must be followed in order for review to be
granted and that failure to follow such procedures can result in either loss or delay
of review. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), involving unusual review procedures under the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970), and Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq. (1970). Under these statutes, review of
EPA promulgation or approval of state air and water implementation plans is granted
to an aggrieved party as long as the party files for review within a limited time period.
Failure to do so results in a loss of review. For a discussion of these statutes and
Getty, and possible constitutional objections to such review limitations, see Note, Reviewability: Statutory Limitations on the Availability of Judicial Review, 1973 DUKE
IJ. 253, in 1972 Developments.
Probably the most frequent procedural requirement for review is a provision that
all review of an administrative body's decision must take place in a given court, most
often a circuit court of appeals. See, e.g., Anaconda v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301,
1304-05 (10th Cir. 1973), also dealing with the Clean Air Amendments of 1970; Fort
Worth Nat'l Corp. v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 469 F.2d 47, 52 (5th Cir.
1972), dealing with the Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1970. In
Fort Worth, the court noted that designating an exclusive forum of review prevents
conflicting rulings and duplicative proceedings, thus promoting "efficient and timely
resolution of disputes concerning agency actions and . . . uniformity in judicial
decisions." Id. However, in the same opinion the court indicated that the
right to review was still of such great importance that it may be allowable in a
court other than that named by statute in certain exceptional circumstances, such as
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It is clear that, if action is committed exclusively to agency dis-

cretion, the exercise of that discretion is not subject to judicial review. 22
However, this limitation upon review has also been narrowly construed.

The court will rigorously examine the statute granting authority to the
administrator, the congressional purpose, and other data, such as the

pertinent adminstrative regulations, in order to delineate the parameters within which the adminstrator may permissibly exercise his discre-

tion; if those bounds are exceeded, review will be granted.2 3 This
principle was effectively demonstrated in 1973 in Berends v. Butz, 24
where the Secretary of Agriculture, who, through the Farmers Home

Administration (F-IA), which has absolute discretion in deciding to
whom certain emergency loans are to be granted, 5 announced it was
terminating all such loans in the future. The court granted review

of this termination, stating that the FH-A had absolute discretion only
as to whom the loans are to be granted, not as to whether the loans
are to be granted at all. In terminating the loan program, the FHIA
had, in the court's view, exceeded its scope of discretion, and thus the

decision was subject to judicial review. 26 In refusing to liberally conwhere the statutorily prescribed method is found inadequate or where an agency has
clearly exceeded its statutory or constitutional authority. Id.
A recent case demonstrating the great complexity of procedures that a statute may
set out is Dow Chem. Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 477 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1973). Dow
deals with review under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 135 et seq. (1970), where a party seeking review is given a choice of procedures to follow in pressing his claim. Appellant asked for an advisory hearing and
sought review of the Secretary's refusal to follow the opinion of the advisory board.
Review was denied, since under the procedure chosen, no final, binding reviewable order had yet been made. 477 F.2d at 1325-26.
22. See, e.g., Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958); Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969); Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965); Palmer v. Rogers, 33 AD. L.2d 893 (D.D.C.
1973).
Courts are particularly reluctant to subject an agency's prosecutorial discretion to
judicial review. See, e.g., Newspaper Local 187 v. NLRB, 489 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.
1973); Harper v. Kleindienst, 362 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1973); Holly Farms Poultry
Indus., Inc. v. Kleindienst, 1973-1 Trade Cas. 94,380 (M.D.N.C., May 10, 1973);
Lentschke v. Nash, 33 AD. L.2d 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
Section 10 of the APA specifically excludes from judicial review actions which
are committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).
23. See, e.g., Breen v. Selective Serv. Bd., 396 U.S. 460 (1970); Oestereich v.
Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
24. 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973).
25. Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961, 7 U.S.C. § 1961(a)
(1970). See 357 F.Supp.at 150.
26. The Secretary is "authorized" to make such loans by the Consolidated Farmers
Home Administration Act of 1961, 7 U.S.C. § 1961(b) (1970). The Berends court
concluded that use of the term "authorized" was intended to make the exercise of such
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strue the extent of the F-IA's absolute discretion the court reached

a result fully in harmony with holdings which, as a prerequisite to the
barring of judicial review, have demanded a clear showing that the
statutory provision alleged to prohibit review specifically applies to the

particular action in dispute.
Statutory Extension of JudicialReview
Although the APA provides for judicial review of only final
agency action28 and the great majority of statutes are couched in similar terms,29 some statutes authorize judicial review of actions which
would be deemed nonreviewable under the APA standard. For example, courts have frequently recognized that statutes granting review
to any party "aggrieved" by an agency action provides for review of
administrative action which would not otherwise be subject to review."0
loans mandatory through a close examination of the legislative history of the Act, 357
F. Supp. at 149-51, and through comparison with the analogous case of Dubrow v.
Small Business Administration, 345 F. Supp. 4 (C.D. Cal. 1972), involving a similar
question of interpretation under the Disaster Relief Act of 1970. 42 U.S.C. § 4451
(1970).
27. See notes 8-21 supra and accompanying text. See also Manges v. Camp, 474
F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1973). In Manges, the Comptroller of the Currency attempted to
forbid from participation in bank affairs a person who had six years earlier been found
guilty of making a false statement to the Small Business Administration. The Comptroller's order was based on 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g) (1) (1970), which not only gave him
the right to prohibit all felons from participation in bank affairs, but which also placed
such prohibition in his sole discretion. However, the statute allowed prohibitions from
the time when a person "is charged" with a felony and was to remain in effect until
the charge "is finally disposed of or until terminated by the agency." Id. (emphasis
supplied). The court interpreted this as applying only to presently charged offenders,
and, ironically, not also to offenders who had previously been convicted. Thus the
court found the Comptroller's prohibition of a previously convicted felon beyond the
authority committed to the exclusive discretion of the agency, and it therefore proceeded
to review the case. 474 F.2d at 101. It could be argued, however, that the time limits
of the statute dictated termination of the prohibition only when the individual is acquitted of the crime. The term "is finally disposed of" lends itself to such interpretation, and it is difficult to understand why a Comptroller should be able to prohibit
a presumably innocent party merely charged with a crime from participation in bank
affairs and not a convicted felon who has served his sentence. That the court refused
even to discuss such a construction is further evidence of the judicial tendency to narrowly construe statutory preclusions of review.
28. APA § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). For a discussion of the finality requirement, see notes 102-22 infra and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1970) (review of deportation orders); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2239(b) (1970) (review of AEC orders).
30. See, e.g., ICC v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 383 U.S. 576, 602 (1966); Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1953). In addition to
statutes extending review to "aggrieved" parties, statutes may provide for review of an
otherwise unreviewable order. See, e.g., Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C.
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The implications of such differences in statutory language were effectively pointed out in the recent case of Citizens for a Safe Environment

v. AEC3 where the Third Circuit refused to review an Atomic Energy
Commission order made in the context of a licensing proceeding in which

the Commission had denied appellants request for prepayment of their

court costs. 32 In refusing to review the order, the court declined to follow
the 1972 decision of Greene County Planning Board v. FPC,33 where

the Second Circuit granted review of a similar order by the FPC.3 4 The
Third Circuit distinguished the Greene County case on the basis that the
AEC review sought in Citizens for a Safe Environment was controlled
by the Administrative Orders Review Acte5 which provided for review in
the court of appeals of "all final orders"3 6 of the AEC, while in
Greene County review of FPC proceedings was mandated by the Federal Power Act 37 which stated, "Any party to a proceeding . . . ag-

grieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceedings
may obtain a review of such order ...

*"38

The court then held

that though a party may be aggrieved by the prepayment of expenses
for which he will eventually be reimbursed, no final order has been

made in such a case and review is thus precluded. 39
By restricting review to final orders, the Administrative Orders
Review Act clearly mandates that review should be granted only

where an agency action has such a direct impact upon a party as to
conclusively inflict hardship.40 Under such a stringent requirement,
the court's refusal to grant review in Citizens for a Safe Environment
would seem proper since the appellant had not alleged that the deci§ 70s(b) (1970), which specifically provides for appeal to the Court of Claims from
"any interlocutory determination by the Commission establishing the liability of the
United States notwithstanding such determination is not for any reason whatever final
as to the amount of recovery. . . ." For recent applications of the statute see United
States v. Kiowa, Comanche & Apache Tribes, 479 F.2d 1369 (Ct. C1. 1973), and
United Sattes v. Fort Sill Apache Tribe, 481 F.2d 1294 (Ct. Cl. 1973), petition for
cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3471 (U.S. Feb. 8, 1974) (No. 73-1220).
31. 489 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1973).
32. The appellants requested $30,000 financial assistance for legal fees, technical
experts, and witnesses to insure a full and complete hearing. Id. at 1020.
33. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
34. Although review was granted in Greene County on the subject of fee prepayment, in its discussion of the merits of this question the court refused to order such
prepayment. Id. at 426-27.
35. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-51 (1970).
36. Id. § 2342(4) (1970) (emphasis added).
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a et seq. (1970).
38. Id. § 8251(b) (emphasis added).
39. 489 F.2d at 1021-22.
40. See notes 102-13 infra and accompanying text.

390

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1974:382

sion to deny fee prepayment had subjected him to a harm which judicial review of a final appeal at the conclusion of the proceedings41
would be inadequate to prevent.
RIPENESS

When a party seeks judicial review of an agency decision (generally in the form of the promulgation of a rule or the issuance of
an order) before the decision is applied specifically against that party,
the court may deny review on the grounds that the controversy is not
ripe for adjudication. 42 Ripeness involves a consideration of the fitness of the decision for immediate judicial resolution and the hardship
to the parties of withholding review. 48 The basic principle which underlies this requirement of ripeness as a prerequisite to judicial review
is that "[j]udicial machinery should be conserved for problems which
are real and present or imminent, not squandered on problems which
are abstract or hypothetical or remote." 44
The leading example of a pragmatic application of the ripeness
doctrine is the landmark case of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. United States,45 where the Supreme Court allowed pre-enforcement
review of a newly passed FCC order promulgating regulations governing radio broadcasting station licensing. The regulations provided that
no license was to be granted to a station having certain chain broadcasting contracts with a network organization. 40 Appellant CBS, a network that had entered into 115 contracts which were proscribed by
the regulations, alleged that, even though the regulations remained unenforced as of that time, their very existence was causing CBS to suffer
severe business loss in that several stations were terminating their contracts or refusing to renew because of the regulations. The Court rec41. See notes 105, 106 infra and accompanying text. The court made clear that the
denomination of the order as non-final was based solely on lack of impact upon the
appellant by stating, "judicial review at this time might not disrupt the orderly processes
of adjudication." 489 F.2d at 1022. Also, the opinion was expressly limited not to
reflect on the reviewability of a fee prepayment denial where the complaining party
alleges failure to allow such prepayment would deny him effective participation in the
agency proceedings by virtue of indigency, thus arguably having such a substantial effect on the plaintiff as to be considered final. Id. at 1022-23.
42. See 3 DAVIS § 21; L. JAFFE ch. 10.
43. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
44. 3 K. DAvis § 21.01, at 116.
45. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
46. Chain broadcasting is the means by which radio programs are made available
to a large nationwide audience by simultaneously broadcasting a program on several
broadcasting stations. Id. at 410. For a discussion of the proscribed provisions
disputed in CBS, see id. at 412.
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ognized the regulations "would disrupt appellant's broadcasting system
and seriously disorganize its business"" and stated that to deny review
on the basis that the order did not directly affect the plaintiff until
enforcement was sought would be to exalt form over substance. 48 The
regulations had the force of substantive law before their sanctions were
invoked, as well as after, since their very existence operated to force
the stations either to sever their affiliation or to risk the loss of their
broadcasting license.49 At a minimum, the CBS holding suggests that
where an administrative order forces a regulated party to either change
its present course of everyday conduct or face possible prosecution,
it should be subject to immediate judicial review.50 The CBS Court
thus rejected a "form over substance" approach and laid down a standard for determining the propriety of pre-enforcement review:
The ultimate test of reviewability is not to be found in an overrefined
technique, but in the need of the review to protect from the irreparable
injury threatened in the exceptional case by administrative rulings
which attach legal consequences to action taken in advance of other
hearings and adjudications that may follow, the results of which the
regulations purport to control. 51
In the 1967 case of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,52 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the pragmatic approach suggested by CBS,
setting forth a clearly delineated, two-pronged test of ripeness.
Whether an issue is ripe for review demands, first, an evaluation of
its fitness for judicial resolution and, second, a determination of the
hardship the plaintiff would bear as a result of withholding judicial
review.5 3 The pragmatic standards of Abbott Laboratorieshave been
widely accepted and have resulted in increased emphasis on ripeness
as a factor determining reviewability. 54
47. Id. at 424.
48. Id. at 418-19.
49. Id. at 417.
50. See Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956); cf. United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
51. 316 U.S. at 415.
52. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).

53. Id. at 149.
54. See, e.g., National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d
689 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Koss v. SEC, 364 F. Supp. 1321
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). But cfi. Florida v. Richardson, 355 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Fla. 1973).
Indeed, one commentator has gone so far as to infer that instead of examining
the rather elastic doctrine of finality as a separate doctrine, see notes 102-22 infra
and accompanying text, it should be considered part of the ripeness test set out in Abbott Laboratories. See Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness
in Administrative Law, 69 Mcn L. REv. 1443, 1515-16 (1971). See also 1971 Devel-
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However, the standards do not mandate judicial review of disputed agency action which has no immediate substantial effect upon
the complaining party."5 This was demonstrated by the 1973 case
of Holly Farms Poultry Industries, Inc. v. Kleindienst,8 in which the

court denied review of an administrative action which displeased the
petitioner but did not affect his legal rights in any substantial manner.
In Holly Farms, the plaintiff had asked the Department of Justice for

an advisory opinion regarding the antitrust implications of a proposed
course of conduct which Holly Farms was considering. 57 The adminis-

trative action for which review was sought consisted of a letter from
the Attorney General's office refusing to state an enforcement inten-

tion regarding Holly Farm's proposed course of conduct together with
a subsequent press release and address by members of the Attorney
General's staff which, though not specifically aimed at plaintiff, clearly
reflected a 'negative attitude toward its proposed course of conduct. 8
In denying review, the court emphasized that judicial review of an
administrative interpretation concerning a hypothetical course of con-

duct is improper.5 9
opments 276, 292. If this assertion is combined with the present tendency to consider
formality similarly, see notes 92, 93, 101 infra and accompanying text, this would make
the Abbott Laboratoriesripeness standards the sole determinant of direct reviewability.
However, another commentator has contended that finality and ripeness are totally
distinct doctrines. He argues that ripeness can be seen as strictly a judicial construct
designed to eliminate premature judicial action, while finality pertains as well to the
integrity of agency processes and demands consideration of the administrative-judicial
separation of power. See 112 U. PA. L. Rnv. 135, 136 n.10 (1963).
For an example of pre-enforcement review in 1973, see Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842, 847-48 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S.
Jan. 14, 1974), where immediate review was granted of an FPC order promulgating
a rulemaking procedure for the fixing of rates of natural gas sales in interstate commerce.
55. See, e.g., Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 171-74 (1967), considered by the Supreme Court as a companion case to Abbott.
56. 1973-1 Trade Cas. 94,380 (M.D.N.C. May 10, 1973).
57. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1973) (empowering the Department of Justice, under the
Business Review Procedure, to give advisory opinions as to possible antitrust violations).
58. The press release was issued by the Department of Justice. The address was
made by the Chief of the Trial Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to
a meeting of the Legal, Tax & Accounting Committee of the National Council of
Farmer Cooperatives. Neither communique referred to the plaintiff, but both clearly
implied that anyone engaging in the disputed conduct would be in violation of antitrust laws. 1973-1 Trade Cas. at 94,380-81.
59. Id. at 94,382-83. See also Helco Prods. Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C.
Cir. 1943); Floersheim v. Weinburger, 346 F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1972).
Although the Holly Farms court primarily based its decision on a lack of ripeness,
the opinion indicates additional bases for denying -review. The action could be viewed
as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion committed solely to the agency and thus non-
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Such a refusal of review is consistent with the principles enunciated in Abbot Laboratories,particularly in light of the second factor

of its ripeness test-the hardship to plaintiffs of withholding judicial
review. Where a party is presently engaged in activity which an administrator determines to be illegal, delaying review may cause great hardship: the party must either change its present course of conduct, which
may be extremely costly, or face possible punishment for continuing this
course of conduct. However, where the administrative action complained of is merely an opinion as to the legality of a proposed course

of conduct, the impact upon the aggrieved party is much less severe
since he is not placed in the dilemma of either incurring the cost of
changing his conduct or facing the threat of imminent prosecution.

A less satisfactory application of ripeness standards is found in
PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC,6" a 1973 decision in which the
Third Circuit, over a vigorous dissent,6 1 held that the Securities Exchange Act of 193462 barred judicial review of a rule promulgated
by the SEC which severely limits the participation of institutional in-

vestors in a national securities exchange. 63

The court based its de-

cision on the fact that Section 19(b) of the Act6" clearly gives the
SEC the right to take action either by order, which is a quasi-judicial
exercise, or by rule, a quasi-legislative exercise. 6 5 However, section
25(a) explicitly grants judicial review only to orders. 66 The court exreviewable. 1973-1 Trade Cas. at 94,382. Alternatively, the action could be viewed
as insufficiently formal to constitute definite agency action and thus warrant review.
Id. at 94,382-89. See notes 79-101 infra and accompanying text.
60. 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3610 (U.S. Apr. 29,
1974).
61. Id. at 733-51 (Adams, J., dissenting).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et seq. (1970).
63. The rule in question, SEC Rule 19(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1973), is
premised upon the basic theory that a condition precedent to membership on a public
exchange is a willingness to serve the investing public. Therefore, it conditions future
membership of both present and potential member brokerage firms upon a manifestation of such willingness. For purposes of this determination, the rule establishes a rebuttable presumption that any brokerage company is serving the public if at least
80 per cent of its business volume is transacted for nonaffiliated persons. 485 F.2d at
720.
Because the rule requires the exchanges to supplement or alter their rules to conform to its terms, it first was submitted to the exchanges by letter, seeking voluntary
compliance pursuant to section 19(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970). When
voluntary compliance was not secured, the SEC held a rulemaking proceeding under
section 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), this rule was then promulgated and
was in effect when PBW was litigated. 485 F.2d at 719.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
65. See 1 K. DAVIS § 5.01.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1970).
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amined the legislative history of the statute and concluded that Con-

gress intended to insulate exercise of the SEC's quasi-legislative rulemaking powers from direct appellate review in order to prevent the
judiciary from substituting its opinion for that of the SEC on legislative
policy matters.67 It therefore denied judicial review of the contested
rule.

In denying review, the court explicitly rejected the contention that
review should not depend upon the "label" which the SEC affixed

to its action-that the content of the action rather than its form should
determine its reviewability. Ignoring the broad implications of the
CBS Court's "form over substance" approach, the PBW court distinguished that decision on the grounds that, unlike the rule contested
in PBW, the FCC regulations challenged in CBS were not promulgated

under a statutory design which distinguished between a regulation and
an order in determining the availability of judicial review.0 8 The PBW
67. See 485 F.2d at 723-26. The chief source from which the majority deduced
this intent was a proposed amendment to section 19(b) at the time of its drafting
which would have explicitly granted review of rules as well as allowing review of orders.
Supporters of the amendment pointed out that the section, as it stood, gave no recourse
to the courts to aggrieved parties when rules were promulgated under the section, 78
CONG. REc. 8092 (1934) (remarks of Representative Wadsworth). The opponents of
the amendment made clear their desire to limit recourse to the courts under section
25(a) to a review of orders of the SEC. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REc. 8090-91 (1934)
(remarks of Representative Snell). This desire was fulfilled when the amendment was
rejected and judicial review was restricted to SEC orders.
The court compared the above legislative history with the holding in AF of L
v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). In AF of L the Court refused review of an NLRB
collective bargaining unit certification. The review provisions of the NLRA provided
review of final orders, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970). Review was so designed because
the predecessor statute had allowed review of both final orders and orders of certification, but in drafting the NLRA, Congress clearly wished to preclude review of orders
of certification and indicated this desire by changing the review statute to include only
final orders. 308 U.S. at 409-11. The PBW majority described the relevance of AP
of L to the PBW situation as "immediate and compelling." 485 F.2d at 727.
Compare 485 F.2d at 723-26 with note 75 infra and accompanying text.
68. Review of the FCC decisions in CBS was governed by the review provision
of the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 219 (1913), as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 402 (1970). This section of the Communications Act incorporated the Urgent Deficiencies Act (UDA), ch. 32, 38 Stat. 220 (1913), as amended, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1253, 2101, 2284, 2325 (1970). The PBW court noted that "[ilt had long been
a settled doctrine that orders of agencies subject to -review under the [UDA . . . could
be reviewed whether they involved a quasi-judicial or -legislative exercise of that agency's powers." 485 F.2d at 729. However, under the UDA whether a particularorder
was reviewable depended upon its substantive impact upon the regulated parties. Thus,
the PBW majority interpreted the broad pragmatic language of CBS as applicable only
to whether the order in question in that case had a sufficient impact upon its regulated
parties as to warrant review. Accordingly, the majority did not find that CBS stood
for the proposition that where a statute insulates from judicial review the quasi-legisla-
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court then concluded that where a statute such as the Securities Exchange Act does so provide, the form of action taken will determine
its reviewability. 69
In contrast, Judge Adams' dissenting opinion favored the frequently supported proposition that where an agency takes some form
of final action on an issue-whether this action be in the form of adjudication of a dispute, promulgation of a rule, or any other procedure-which has a direct and immediate effect on a party's activities,
immediate review should be granted unless specifically precluded by
statute.70 The dissent argued that the majority's rigid interpretation
of the statutory language disregarded the presumption of reviewability
suggested ,by the APA 71 and explicitly articulated in Abbott Laboratories.72 Moreover, such a mechanical approach ignored the pragmatic principles enunciated in CBS. That decision, the dissent contended, had an "overarching significance" which extended well beyond
its particular factual context.73 In the dissents view, CBS had established an approach which has since guided judicial determinations of
reviewability of administrative actions: "The particular label placed
upon . . . [the action] by the Commission is not necessarily conclu-

sive, for it is the substance of what the Commission has purported
to do and has done which is decisive." 74 The validity of this approach
was further supported by Judge Adams' examination of the statute's
legislative history and his conclusion that there is no "clear and convincing" legislative intent to insulate otherwise reviewable SEC actions merely
because they are framed in the form of rules rather than orders.75 Extive rulemaking activities of an agency, as opposed to a quasi-judicial "order," a court
may nonetheless ignore the form of that action and determine its reviewability on
the basis of its practical effect upon the regulated parties. Id. at 729-30.
69. 485 F.2d at 733.
70. See id. at 737-39.
71. See note 1 supra.
72. See note 1 supra.
73. 485 F.2d at 741. Judge Adams noted the large number of cases which interpreted CBS as dictating review to be based on the substantive effect of the agency
action without regard to its form. See id. at 743-45.
74. 316 U.S. at 416.
75. 485 F.2d at 745-49. Judge Adams pointed to the lack of preclusionary language in the Act and took issue with the majority's statement that the Act's
legislative history "reveals a clear and unequivocal intention to insulate Commission rules or regulations from review under § 25(a)." Id. at 745. He did not
attempt to show that the legislature intended for the Securities Exchange Act to dictate
review of the SEC's quasi-legislative action. He merely showed that the legislative debates over the Act, taken as a whole, do not make it at all clear that the legislative
history necessarily requires an interpretation of statutory preclusion and, in light of
the presumption of review, such a clear intent to preclude is required. Id. at 745-49.
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amining the SEC action in light of these principles, the dissent found that

its impact upon the legal rights of the regulated parties was so immediate
and concrete that direct review should have been granted. 7

The reasoning adopted by the dissent appears consistent with the
prevailing judicial approach toward reviewability-that judicial review
of final agency action is presumed unless clearly prohibited and that
the test for determining reviewability should focus upon the substantive impact, not formalistic labels. 77 It is evident that denial of preenforcement review of the rule in question will impose substantial
hardship upon PBW and similarly situated exchanges. Since prior
to the promulgation of the challenged rule, the PBW Stock Exchange

had a large number of institutionally affiliated members, now that the
rule has become effective PBW will either have to revamp its membership and thereby suffer great pecuniary loss or disobey the rule and

thereby risk subjection to enforcement proceedings. 78 An administrative action which places the regulated party in such a cruel dilemma
meets the ripeness standards articulated in CBS and Abbott Laboratdries and thus should be reviewable immediately.
FORmALITY

Courts have at times refused to review various forms of informal

administrative action such as advisory opinions, recommendations, or
policy statements. 79 The rationale for refusing judicial review of
See notes 8-13 supra and accompanying text.
In his examination of the legislative history, Judge Adams pointed out that after
the amendment to explicitly provide for review of rules was rejected, see note 67 supra,
a compromise bill was passed which frequently has been interpreted as continuing the
preclusion of review of quasi-legislative actions. However, he believed it was not at
all clear that all Congressmen subscribed to this conclusion. For example, Representative Lea expressed a belief that rules used to carry out quasi-judicial functions should
be reviewable. 78 CONG. REc. 8091 (1934). Representative Rayburn believed review
would still be available if the SEC "exceeded its jurisdiction and authority under the
Act," which was the precise contention of the petitioners in PBW. Id. Thus, Judge
Adams concluded that the limitation of section 25(a) to orders was not dictated by
a sufficiently clear legislative intent to preclude review of rules. Compare 485 F.2d
at 737-39 with note 67 supra and accompanying text.
76. 485 F.2d at 749-51.
77. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842, 847-48 (10th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1974).
78. See 485 F.2d at 735-37. The immediacy of the impact of the rule promulgation on PBW's activities is heightened by the rule's requirement that institutional members, within 30 days of the rule's effective date, file with the exchanges a statement
of their intention to comply. Judge Adams believed that this made clear that the
promulgation was of "immediate and concrete significance" and thus immediately reviewable. Id. at 749-50.
79. For a general discussion of some of the uses of informal agency action, see
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such informal actions is that they have no immediate effect on the
legal rights or obligations of a party; thus delay of review inflicts no
substantial injury. ° Also, the judiciary places great value on such informal procedures. It has been observed that "to permit suits for declaratory judgments upon mere informal, advisory, administrative opin-

ions might well discourage the practice of giving such opinions, with
a net loss of far greater proportions to the average citizen than any
81
possible gain which could accrue.
This formality doctrine was initially applied in Helco Products Co.
v. McNutt.s2 In Helco the plaintiff submitted a proposed course of

conduct to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and asked for
a statement as to its legality.

The FDA responded by letter, stating

the conduct would be illegal. The plaintiff then asked for immediate
review of the agency position as reflected in the letter."' The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the letter

was not subject to judicial review, pointing out that the letter was written by a party not qualified to initiate an enforcement action if the

proposed conduct were undertaken

4

and that, since the letter per-

tained only to proposed conduct, the plaintiff's present activities were
unaffected.8 5 The court heavily stressed the benefits of such advisory

opinions and evinced a clear dislike for any course of action that would
86
discourage agencies from undertaking such practices.

Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Some Recent Developments in
Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DuKE L.J. 51, 53-67; Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity
by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARv. L. Rlv. 1380, 1382-1419 (1973).
80. See, e.g., Helco Prods. Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
Third Ave. Ry. v. SEC, 85 F.2d 914, 915 (2d Cir. 1936).
81. Helco Prods. Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1943). See notes
82-86 infra and accompanying text.
82. 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
83. Id. at 681-82.
84. The court placed great emphasis on the need for immediate and definite threat
of prosecution for the order to be reviewable. Since neither the party who made the
order nor his superior, the Federal Security Administrator, had power to prosecute, but
only to give an advisory opinion to the Attorney General, who would then have unfettered discretion to decide whether a violation had occurred and whether to prosecute,
the order in the letter did not qualify for review. Id. at 683. Cf. Kixmiller v. SEC,
34 Ai. L.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
85. This distinction between proposed and pre-existing conduct was also demonstrated in Holly Farms Poultry Indus., Inc. v. Kleindienst, 1973-1 Trade Cas. 94,380
(M.D.N.C., May 10, 1973), where review of an advisory letter from the Department
of Justice was denied because the opinion dealt only with proposed, hypothetical conduct. See notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text. Similarly, in Floersheim v.
Weinburger, 346 F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1972), review was denied from an advisory
opinion dealing with a proposed course of business, id. at 956-57, but granted where
the opinion dealt with an already established mode of business, id. at 953-56.
86. 137 F.2d at 684.
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The limitations of this formality doctrine were clearly delineated
in Independent Broker-Dealers Trade Association v. SEC,87 where the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
suggestions made by the SEC to the New York Stock Exchange, which
led to a vote by the Exchange to abolish customer-directed give-ups88
of brokerage fees, constituted agency action sufficiently final and definite to entitle an affected party to obtain immediate review of the legality of the action. The court made it clear that "captions or labels"
should not be determinative of reviewability.8 9 Rather, the court
broadly viewed the extent of the SEC's involvment in the process
which culminated in the Exchange's decision to abolish give-ups. 0°
Noting that the SEC had long been pressing the Exchange to amend its
rate structure, the court concluded that compliance was hardly a voluntary submission to an agency request, but rather an attempt both to
respond to agency action and concurrently to salvage as much of the
rate schedule as possible. 91 The rationale for determining formality
expressed in Independent Broker-Dealers is thus very similar to that
utilized in determining whether agency action is sufficiently ripe for
adjudication. 2 Rather than depending on formalistic labels and simplified rules of thumb, the court focused its injuiry on whether the agency
action had been of such a nature as to have an immediate and adverse
effect upon the complaining party.93
However a 1973 decision, Koss v. SEC,94 suggests that despite
the broad language of Independent Broker-Dealers,which implied that
identical considerations were involved in determining both formality
87. 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
88. In 1971 Developments, the "give-up" was described as
the practice whereby a securities broker pays another broker-dealer a part of
the minimum commission which, under the rigid minimum commission rate
structure of the Exchange, he is required to charge his customer. The Exchange did not permit volume discounts on commissions based on number of
shares sold in a transaction, and in order to circumvent the rate structure,
brokers were willing to "give-up" large percentages of their commissions in
order to execute high volume orders. 1971 Developments 276, 281 n.28.
89. 442 F.2d at 139. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S.
407, 425 (1942); PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 741-42 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3610 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1974) (Adams, J.,dissenting);
Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
990 (1954).
90. 442 F.2d at 137.
91. Id. at 144.
92. See notes 42-78 supra and accompanying text.
93. 442 F.2d at 139-42. See also National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Holly Farms Poultry Indus., Inc. v.
Kleindienst, 1973-1 Trade Cas. 94,380 (M.D.N.C., May 10, 1973); Florsheim v. Weinburger, 346 F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1972).
94. 364 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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and ripeness, the limitations of Helco are still viable, and formality
does retain some utility as a separate factor to be considered in deter-

mining the appropriateness of judicial review. In Koss, the plaintiff
was an underwriter against whom certain SEC actions were pending.
While these proceedings were pending, six securities issuers who in-

tended to use the plaintiff for their issues received comment letters
from the SEC's Regional Offices, written by staff members responsible
for reviewing offer circulars to be issued pursuant to the securities laws.
The letters requested that the circulars be amended to disclose that

the plaintiff was a respondent in an SEC administrative proceeding
and the nature of the charges.95 After two of the issuers thereafter
changed underwriters, plaintiff brought suit for injunctive relief from

the requests of the comment letters.
The court viewed the case from two perspectives. It first focused upon the two-pronged ripeness test of Abbott Laboratories-

the fitness of the questions presented by the contested administrative
action for judicial determination and the degree of hardship imposed

on the aggrieved party by withholding review9 -and
comment letters were not ripe for review. 97

concluded the

The court then stated

that an alternative basis for denying review was the informal nature.
of the agency activity. 98 In so holding, the court compared the nature
of the agency action in Koss with the nature of that in Helco. The

SEC staff members who wrote the comment letters in Koss were totally incapable of enforcing the request contained therein. 99 Thus,
95. See id. at 1323 n.7.
96. See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text.
97. The chief difficulties with the action from a ripeness viewpoint were that the
letters had been withdrawn and that they pertained only to a proposed circular that
had not yet been issued. 364 F. Supp. at 1324-25. Agency action concerned only
with proposed conduct has been held not ripe for review under the Abbott Laboratories
test. The issues are not fit for review because the appellant is not forced to
decide between changing his present course of conduct or facing possible punishment. Since such an appellant may continue his present course of conduct without
any assertion of enforcement against him by the agency, there is little hardship in denying review. See notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 1325.
99. Only their superiors could enforce such requests by acting on behalf of the
SEC, and these superiors had expressed a definite lack of enforcement intention. Id.
at 1325-26. Upon hearing of the regional office's comment letters, the SEC issued
a "Minute Order" stating it neither approved nor disapproved of the staff's comments
but viewed them as raising "significant questions of administrative policy" concerning
disclosure. Id. at 1324 n.9. Pursuant to the "Minute Order," the Chief of the Branch
of Small Issues of the Division of Corporate Finance of the SEC wrote the plaintiff's
attorney, informing him the comment letters had been withdrawn but also stating that
the plaintiff would be "requested" by the regional offices to make full disclosure to
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as in Helco, there was a lack of immediate threat of prosecution for
failing to comply with the comment letter requests. Rather, the action
in question was merely advisory in nature in that it suggested a proper
mode of future conduct.'

In Koss, the court recognized that its decision could have been
based solely upon ripeness; the formality doctrine is discussed only as
"[a]nother way of categorizing the events."' 0 ' However, by using the
formality doctrine as an alternative basis of its decision, the court indi-

cated that the formality rule still retains some degree of independent
significance as a factor to be considered in deciding whether to review.
The validity of such an approach is questionable. As demonstrated
in Independent Broker-Dealers, to determine reviewability on the

basis of whether the disputed action is labeled "formal" or "informal"
is to exalt form over substance. The significant factor is not what
form the action takes, but rather its effect upon the rights and obligations of the affected party.

Under this rationale, the formality of the

agency action is irrelevant; rather, its reviewability should be determined by the functional approach established by CBS and Abbott Lab-

oratories.
FINALITY

Courts have traditionally held that only final, as opposed to intermediate, administrative action is subject to judicial review. 10 This judicial requirement has been codified in section 10(c) of the APA
which provides in part:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject
to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency
action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on review
of the final agency action. 103
potential issuers. Id. at 1324.
In another recent decision analogous to Koss, Kixmiller v. SEC, 34 AD.
L.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1974), review was denied of a letter from the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance stating the Division's intention not to urge action by
the SEC for omissions of petitioner's proposals from a corporation's 1972 proxy statement. Since the Division had no authority to make orders and the SEC had not
adopted the Division's position, the letter was held insufficiently formal to warrant immediate review. Id. at 362.
100. Such an order could, therefore, also be seen as unreviewable from a viewpoint
of ripeness in that it is merely advisory and does not operate with any direct impact
upon appellant as to cause hardship or injury. See notes 45-53 supra and accompanying text.
101. 364 F. Supp. at 1325.
102. 3 K. DAvis §§ 20.01, 20.05; L. JAFlE 424-26.
103. APA § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). Earlier cases placed a very heavy em-
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Thus, unless the particular action complained of has been made spephasis on the more general doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies rather
than framing opinions in terms of finality -requirements. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Railroad & Warehouse Comm'n v. Duluth St.
Ry., 273 U.S. 625 (1927); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196 (1924);
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908); United States v. Sing Tuck,
194 U.S. 161 (1904); Altschul v. Gittings, 86 F. 200 (C.C.D. Ore. 1898); Dundee
Mortgage Trust Inv. Co. v. Charlton, 32 F. 192 (C.C.D. Ore. 1887). However, limitations in the exhaustion doctrine subsequently became apparent. See Pepsico, Inc. v.
FTC, 472 F.2d 179, 186 n.7 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
But cf. Note, Interim Relief and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: A Study in
ludicial Confusion, 1973 DUKE L.J. 275, 293 n.81 in 1972 Developments. These limitations were effective demonstrated in 1973 in American Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 359 F.
Supp. 887 (S.D. Tex. 1973), where immediate review was sought of the denial of a motion to dismiss FTC proceedings concerned with a proposed merger of life insurance
companies for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. If the exhaustion doctrine were applied in this case, immediate review of the denial of the motion to dismiss would arguably have been allowable since appellants had exhausted all possible administrative
remedies with respect to the jurisdictional issue for which judicial review was sought.
However, exhaustion is really a meaningless consideration in deciding on reviewability.
None of the considerations to be promoted by prohibiting interlocutory appeals such as
avoidance of useless expense and delay, see notes 104-06 infra and accompanying text,
would be served by blindly following the exhaustion doctrine in American Gen. Ins.
Here the exhaustion doctrine would have allowed review of a mere preliminary order
that could easily be corrected through one final appeal, but also could become moot
before such final appeal. Thus, it has become recognized that a far more practical approach to this variety of reviewability questions is to approach the issue by inquiring
whether the agency has acted with sufficient finality to warrant review.
However, the exhaustion doctrine does retain some viability today. Many authorities claim it may be applied, but only at the court's discretion, to preclude review. See,
e.g., 3 K. DAvis § 20.03; L. JAFFE 432-37. But see Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies, 48 YALE L.L 981, 1006 (1939); McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of
Federal Administrative Orders, 28 CALF. L. REV. 129, 162-64 (1940).
Furthermore, it has often been stated that exhaustion should not be required where
its exercise would be futile. See, e.g., Lodge 1858, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees
v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Williams v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp.
544, 548 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
In American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Acree, 475 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir.
1973), plaintiffs sought review of a holding by the Customs Bureau that there was
no merit in plaintiffs' claim that a Civil Service Commission regulation was unconstitutional. Plaintiffs appealed directly to the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, even though Civil Service regulations allow an appeal to the Civil
Service Commission before recourse to the judiciary. 5 C.F.R. § 752.304 (1973).
The court granted review, stating that it was "exceedingly unlikely" that appeal to the
Civil Service Commission would have gained a reversal. 475 F.2d at 1292. The court
stated it would be "blinking reality" to expect the Commission to hold an agency subject
to its regulation to a higher standard of procedural protection than its own challenged
rule required. Id. Also, the court thought it "unlikely" that the Commission would
act in advance of a court in overturning rules promulgated by itself and consistent with
the applicable governing statute. Id. Therefore, the Acree court declined to apply the
exhaustion doctrine and allowed immediate judicial review of the challenged regulation's
constitutionality.
Finding exhaustion futile because it was "substantially unlikely" that exhausting
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cifically reviewable by statute, the court must ascertain whether it constitutes a final agency action in order to determine its reviewability. The
rationale which underlies the finality rule is similar to that which forms
the basis for the final judgment rule in the federal court system. 10 4
As a practical matter, the finality rule prevents premature interruption
of the administrative process' 0 5 which could result in additional delay
and expense for the purposes of reviewing mere procedural disputes
of interlocutory orders which are often rendered moot by the final
agency decision. 10 6
Although the above considerations generally preclude immediate
review of intermediate or interlocutory agency decisions, it is clear that
a final order need not necessarily be the last order.10 7 While earlier
cases often rigidly applied the finality requirement whenever further
agency hearings or proceedings were contemplated in the resolution
all administrative channels would bring about a different result represents a considerable relaxation of the almost certain futility traditionally required for this type of avoidance of the exhaustion doctrine. The typical futility situation was exemplified by Williams v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.N.C. 1972), where the plaintiff was allowed to bring an action declaring part of the Social Security Act unconstitutional. Although exhaustion would have required waiting for a decision of the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare on the issue, the court granted immediate review on
the basis that the Secretary was specifically required by statute to deny plaintiffs' claim.
Accordingly, there was no "practicalprospect that the statutory review procedure would
be more than an empty formality." Id. at 548 (emphasis supplied). However, notwithstanding the increased availability of judicial review resulting from these developments in the exhaustion doctrine, the finality rule, because it focuses more directly
upon the policies underlying the need for limitation of interlocutory appeals, remains
the more desirable standard.
104. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-94 (1970). It should be noted that in the area of
judicial review of administrative action there is no counterpart to 28 U.S.C. § 1292
which allows appeals of important interlocutory orders when certified by the district
court and accepted by the appellate court.
105. See L. JAFFE 425-26; Comment, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 39
CoRNELL L.Q. 273, 292-93 (1954).

106. See L. JAFFE 424. See also FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375,
383-84 (1938). An additional advantage in refusing interlocutory appeals that was frequently pointed out in 1973 is that by waiting for a final appeal, the reviewing court
receives a complete trial record which expedites its task by clearly delineating the disputed issues. See, e.g., Gage v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bradley v.
Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410 (1st Cir. 1972); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 361 F. Supp.
948 (D.D.C. 1973).
107. See Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 334, 338 (1st Cir.
1953), where Chief Judge Magruder observed that some orders, although "in form
titled as a part of the underlying proceeding. . ., really should be regarded as carved
out of the main proceeding" and therefore are immediately reviewable; accord, Goodman v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 467 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1972); American Communications Ass'n v. United States, 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962); Interstate Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 298 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States,
211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
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of a given dispute, 0 8 it has become generally recognized that finality
should be determined on the basis of the impact of the agency decision
upon the aggrieved party rather than its chronological position in the
administrative process.' 0 9 This view of finality has been cogently articulated by Judge Bazelon:
Whether or not the statutory requirements of finality are satisfied in
any given case depends not upon the label affixed to its action by
the administrative agency but rather upon a realistic appraisal of the
consequences of such action . . . .Thus administrative orders are ordinarily reviewable when "they impose an obligation, deny a right, or
fix some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative
0
process.""11
108. See, e.g., United States v. Los Angeles & S.L. R.R., 273 U.S. 299 (1929);
Canadian River Gas Co. v. FPC, 110 F.2d 350 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
693 (1940); SEC v. Andrews, 88 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1937).
109. Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400
U.S. 62 (1971). The Court stated:
Mhe relevant considerations in determining finality are whether the process
of administrative decisionmaking has reached a stage where judicial review
will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences will flow from the agency
action. Id. at 71, citing ICC v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 383 U.S. 576,
602 (1966); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 143
(1939).
A clear example of this conception of the finality rule was demonstrated in Goodman v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 467 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Goodman, review
was allowed from an order made by the Public Service Commission (PSC) in response
to a utility company's request for authorization of a rate increase. The order established a fair rate of return for the utility company, found that a rate increase was
necessary, and directed the company to present a new rate schedule designed to meet
this rate of return. The court granted -review despite the need for a later order to
be made by the PSC allocating the increase among several categories of customers in
order for the increase to take effect.
In so doing, the court noted that while there remained the necessity of further
action by the PSC, the validity of the increase had been conclusively established at
that point and was not conditional upon future agency action. The court stated, "What
remained to be done was not concerned with the validity of the increase in rates which
had been granted . . . ." Id. at 378. Under such circumstances, legal consequences had clearly flowed from a technically interlocutory order. Also, since the appeal was concerned solely with the validity of the increase and, as stated above, the
future agency action was not concerned with this, it is clear that allowing the immediate appeal on this issue did not have a disruptive effect on the underlying proceeding.
It should be noted that even under this pragmatic approach to the finality doctrine, review of orders that are merely procedural or preliminary in nature and inflict
no irreparable injury is still denied. APA § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970); FPC v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375 (1938); accord, Ecology Action v. AEC,
34 A. L. 2d 510 (2d Cir. 1974); Pepsico, Ixe. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 179 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973); Eastern Util. Associates v. SEC, 162
F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1947); Okim v. SEC, 143 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1944); Mississippi
Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 131 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1942).
110. Isbrandtsen v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 55, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954),
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Viewed in this manner, the test for finality is very similar to the considerations involved in determining ripeness;' review is granted where
an interlocutory order has such an immediate and adverse effect that
it inflicts irreparable injury on the petitioner.:"' Immediate review
of agency action is allowed under a similar rationale where agency actions attach legal consequences to the everyday conduct of parties with
sufficient finality to force the parties to change their conduct or face
3
possible punishment.1
A 1973 case, Harlem Valley Transportation Association v. Stafford" 4 , illustrates the application of this functional approach in determining finality. In Harlem Valley, the plaintiffs sought immediate review of an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) determination
that it was not required to file a draft environmental impact statement
prior to conducting a hearing concerning a proposed railroad abandonment. ' 5 Rejecting the contention that such an order was interlocutory
and therefore not subject to judicial review, the court held that the
order was "complete [and] likely to wreak irreparable injury if
citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942). See
also Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1917),
where the court stated:
The test of finality for purposes of review is not whether the order is the
last administrative order contemplated by the statutory scheme, but rather
whether it imposes an obligation or denies a right with consequences sufficient
to warrant review. Id. at 589 n.8.
111. See notes 45-53 supra and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56
(1939); Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir.
1972), rev'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4203 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974); Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v.
Dixon, 348 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d
51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954). In Isbrandtsen, the irreparable injury rationale was used as a basis for review of the Federal Maritime Board's interim
approval of a dual rate shipping system pending a formal hearing where plaintiff alleged
the use of such system would drive drive him out of business before such formal hearing
was completed.
113. See notes 45-53 -supraand accompanying text.
114. 360 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
115. The plaintiffs claimed a threshold determination of whether an impact statement would be required was dictated by that National Environmental Policy Act, § 102
(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970), which directs all agencies of the federal government to require the preparation of such statements for every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment. The statement is to accompany the proposal
through the existing agency review processes. Thus, the plaintiffs alleged that the ICC
was required to determine if the abandonment proceeding involved major or federal action affecting the quality of the environment and, if so, to require its staff to prepare and
circulate a draft impact statement prior to the commencement of any hearing, so that
evidence and argument could be adduced with reference to the draft. 360 F. Supp.
at 1061. The ICC refuted this claim, contending that NEPA § 102(2)(C) required
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wrong." 1 6 The Court emphasized that absent advance preparation

of an impact statement, the plaintiffs would be unable to effectively
present and analyze environmental considerations at the abandonment

hearings. As a result, the hearing records on environmental aspects
of the abandonment would likely be inadequate, thereby enhancing

the probability of "improvident abandonments at unlawful costs in en117
vironmental injury."'
Harlem Valley thus exemplifies the recognized principle that finality

does not turn upon whether the. disputed order is the last administrative order contemplated by the agency process."" Rather, the appropriate test of finality for review purposes is whether the impact of
the order is sufficiently harmful to the party to warrant review in the

context of the particular situation. 1 9
no agency action in an abandonment proceeding until the initial decision, following
a hearing, by the administrative judge. Id.
116. Id. at 1063-64.
117. Id. at 1064. Another significant aspect of Harlem Valley is its liberal
view of what constitutes irreparable injury. Although the court held that the ICC
decision not to issue an impact statement prior to hearing would likely result in "irreparable" harm, it conceded that its use of the term "irreparable" might be literally questionable, since the decision, if erroneous, could be repaired by ordering the hearings
reheld after reversal of a "final" ICC decision on the merit of abandonment. Id. at
1064 n.9. Cf. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 425-26 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). But cf. Citizens for a Safe Environment v. AEC,
33 AD. L.2d 1068 (3d Cir. 1973). For a discussion of Citizens for a Safe Environment, see notes 31-41 supra and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217 (1963);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Folkways Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 379 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC,
285 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1960); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954); American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191
F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951); cf. United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962).
119. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 591 (D.C. Cir.
1971). See generally text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
Despite the wide judicial recognition of this pragmatic application of the finality
rule, some courts have persisted in utilizing the traditionally restrictive approach of
judging finality by the mere chronological position of an agency order within the underlying proceedings. Such an attitude was exemplified in 1973 in Utah Int'l, Inc. v.
EPA, 478 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1973), where the Tenth Circuit denied review of an
order which disapproved certain previously approved sections of a state air quality
standards implementation plan submitted under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857
et seq. (1970). The review provision of the statute permitted "[a] petition for review
of the Administrator's action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan
.... " Id. § 1857(h)-5(b)(1) (emphasis added). Since the order in question
had denied approval of a plan, it was not specifically subject to review under
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Harlem Valley also illustrates a current tendency of many courts
to neglect consideration of the interference which immediate review

will cause the administrative decision-making process and instead to
determine reviewability primarily on the basis of the impact of the
action on the complaining party.' 2 By providing immediate review
of the question of whether an impact statement requirement determination should precede an ICC hearing, the Harlem Valley decision

exposes the ICC to potentially great disruption. The delay inherent
in such appeals would prolong abandonment proceedings and frustrate
the ICC's attempt to abbreviate its procedures in recognition of the
railways' critical need to abandon unprofitable lines.' 2 ' When this
need for a prompt final decision on the abandonment is combined with
the court's express recognition that the harm caused by postponing re-

view until the proceedings were completed could be repaired by ordering a new hearing at that time, 2 - it would appear that in Harlem Valley the interests of avoiding undue interference with the administrative decision-making process should have outweighed the need to relieve a party directly harmed by agency action.
the Act. 478 F.2d at 127-28. Although the APA provides for judicial review of a
final agency order, section 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970), the court held that the denial of the plan was not a final order since further agency proceedings were to take
place until a plan was adopted. 478 F.2d at 128. Thus, the court concluded that neither the Clean Air Act nor the APA provided a basis for review of the denial order.
The court's opinion reveals a mechanical rather than pragmatic application of the
finality doctrine. In holding that denial orders did not constitute final administrative
action, the court emphasized that by the mere act of disapproval no plan is placed
into effect and the administrative process is simply reactivated until a final plan is
approved. Id. at 127. However, as Harlem Valley clearly demonstrates, the mere presence of future administrative proceedings is in itself an invalid gauge of finality. A
more practical basis on which the Utah International court could have refused review
would have been to note that the mere denial of the plan imposed no legal obligations on
the parties and had no direct impact upon appellant's activities. Rather, it was merely
part of the continuing formulation of a valid state implementation plan which, when
approved, would then be subject to judicial scrutiny.
120. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1974); Medical Comm. for Human
Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S.
403 (1972); Koss v. SEC, 364 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Holly Farms Poultry
Indus., Inc. v. Kleindienst, 1973-1 Trade Cas. 94,380 (M.D.N.C., May 10, 1973).
While the opinions of each of these recent cases at least implicitly alluded to
considerations of comity with the administrative decision-making process, the courts'
primary inquiry focused on the degree of impact of the disputed actions on the complaining parties.
121. See Address by Fritz R. Kahn, General Counsel of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, at a meeting of the Metropolitan New York Chapter of the Association
of Interstate Commerce Commission Practitioners, in New York City, September 11,
1973.
122. See 360 F. Supp. at 1064 n.9. See note 117 supra.
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CONCLUSION

Recent judicial application of the traditional touchstones of reviewability-the overlapping concepts of ripeness, formality, and finalityhas focused on the effect of the administrative action upon the regulated party. Thus, the emphasis is upon the substantive impact of
the action rather than its label, form, or chronological position in the
administrative process. As the majority's opinion in PBW indicates,
this approach is not universal. Yet, as courts generally place more
reliance on the principles enunciated in CBS and Abbott Laboratories,
the traditional concepts of ripeness, formality, and finality, which have
always overlapped to some extent, appear to have been reduced to
a single inquiry-the effect of the administrative action upon the party
seeking review. 123
Implicit in this approach is the relegation to secondary status of
consideration of the degree of interference which immediate review
will cause in the administrative decision-making process. While such
an expansion in the availability of review is appealing because of its
minimization of hardship to the parties, it is submitted that considerations of comity with administrative bodies should not be discarded in
deciding whether a particular administrative action should be subject
to judicial review. Administrative agencies function as entities quite
separate from the judiciary-they are essentially arms of the executive
which possess legislatively conferred powers and duties; accordingly,
courts traditionally have been reluctant to interfere with prescribed administrative procedure through the premature granting of judicial review. Undue disruption and delay often substantially impair the efficiency and effectiveness of these coordinate entities.124 Accordingly,
in employing this functional approach to reviewability, courts should
take care not to limit their inquiry to an examination of the hardship
to the regulated party which denial of immediate review might inflict,
but to consider also the possible adverse consequences to the administrative process which might flow from a precipitate interposition of
the judiciary.
123. See notes 38-59, 77-93, 96-120 supra and accompanying text.
124. L. JAF-FE 425.

